Válka v Tichomoří 1941 - 1945

Furukawa explained them to me on the map board. "There are seven lines extending east and south, with Midway lying within the search arc. We are using one plane each from Akagi and Kaga, two seaplanes each from Tone and Chikuma, and one from Haruna. The search radius is 300 miles for all planes except Haruna's, which is a Type-95 and can do only half that."

Although the coverage appeared adequate, I still felt that a two-phase search would have been wiser. A single-phase search might be sufficient if we wished only to confirm our assumption that no enemy fleet was in the vicinity. However, if we recognized the possibility that this assumption might be wrong and that an enemy force might be present, our searches should have been such as to assure that we could locate and attack it before it could strike at us. For this purpose a two-phase dawn search was the logical answer. As the term indicates, a two-phase search employs two sets of planes which fly the same search lines, with a given time interval between them. Since our planes were not equipped with radar at this time, they were completely reliant on visual observation and could search effectively only by daylight. Consequently, to spot an enemy force as soon as possible after dawn, it was necessary to have one set of planes (the first phase) launched in time to reach the end of their search radius as day was breaking. This meant that the areas traversed in darkness on their outbound flight remained unsearched. Hence, a second-phase search was required over these same lines by planes taking off about one hour later.

Men assigned to the first phase of such a search obviously had to be well trained in night flying. Nagumo had such pilots and could have used this method, but it would have required twice as many planes as a single-phase search. Despite the importance of conducting adequate searches, our naval strategists were congenitally reluctant to devote more than a bare minimum of their limited plane strength to such missions. Ten per cent of total strength was all they were willing to spare for search operations, feeling that the rest should be reserved for offensive use. But such overemphasis on offensive strength had proven detrimental to our purposes before this, and it would again.

"In both the training and organization of our naval aviators, too much importance and effort were devoted to attack. Reconnaissance was taught only as part of the regular curriculum, and no subsequent special training was given. Also, there were no organic reconnaissance units of any appreciable size in the Japanese Navy. When reconnaissance missions were required, attack planes were usually refitted and assigned to perform them. There were no carrier-borne planes designed solely for search. In the Pearl Harbor attack, every carrier-borne bomber of Nagumo's six carriers was assigned to the attack, leaving for search only some ten-odd float planes from the accompanying battleships and cruisers. This had been perhaps the basic reason for Admiral Nagumo's decision to withdraw upon that occasion without exploiting his advantage. At the critical moment, when he had to decide whether to launch another attack on Pearl Harbor, he did not have the vital information which reconnaissance planes could have provided. The Nagumo Force continued to suffer from this same lack of aerial reconnaissance in every action that followed."