Stíhače tanků, samohybná děla…

The question was, of course, what might happen to the tanks if they attempted to advance within a barrage, rather than behind it.
An experiment was organised and it took place at Larkhill on Salisbury Plain, on 5 June 1942, involving a squadron of sixteen Churchills from an unidentified regiment.
Two trials were arranged. In the first, three field regiments of 25-pounders,
that is 72 guns, fired at the rate of 72 rounds per minute into an area 600 yards by 400 yards, firing air-burst high explosive shells. The sixteen tanks concentrated within this area, in a box 300 yards by 400 yards, moving at just 5 mph. It must have taken a fair amount of courage, on the part of the tank crews, to drive in formation into this zone but in fact it proved perfectly safe and there were no personnel casualties whatever. The guns continued firing for eight minutes while the tanks were in the impact area. The tanks discovered that they could not only move about within the fire swept zone but they could still see clearly and deal with any target easily. A number of tanks were hit, and one had its track broken, but the remaining fifteen kept moving. Another tank lost one suspension bogie and broke down shortly afterwards but even then, fourteen tanks survived and the other two were swiftly repaired, so the trial was regarded as a success.
In the second trial the barrage was stepped up to a more realistic intensity. This time as the tanks moved up to the barrage zone the guns fired a concentrated burst for two minutes at the rate of 180 rounds per minute. As the tanks moved into the danger zone this rate reduced to 108 rpm and continued for five minutes. On this occasion there were no tank casualties at all. Crews found that they were not affected by the detonations, nor did they report any difficulty in observation so in a real action they would be able to hunt down the enemy's anti-tank guns with ease. This would mean that many of the guns would be taken out while their crews were sheltering from the barrage in slit trenches. Even if they did emerge to man their guns under fire the chances of picking off approaching tanks with shells exploding all over the place were reduced considerably.
David Fletcher: Mr. Churchill's Tank: The British Infantry Tank Mark IV, Schiffer
Publishing, 1999; s.100 (kap. 7: The Great Rework Scheme)

Meanwhile, in the winter of 1943-44, the secondary roles were actively developed in the theaters. As enemy air power declined, antiaircraft units that were attached to mobile ground troops looked increasingly to surface targets.
The tank destroyers, in the temporarily static conditions of the Italian front,
and in the mountainous Italian terrain where massed armor could not be used,
increasingly operated as reinforcing artillery. Tanks clung more to their primary
role, though they had to be used in driblets. In the United States the Army
Ground Forces, while incorporating the new development, kept it definitely
subordinate to the primary missions of the three arms, in preparation for the
"big show" to come.
Robert R. Palmer: Organization and Training of New Ground Combat Elements: III.3. Tanks, Tank Destroyers, and Antiaircraft Guns as Field Artillery, s. 432 in The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, US Army Center of Military History, 1987